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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
F. WILLIAM McGINN II, \ 
Plaintiff-Respondent, J 
v. I Case No. 
/ 13619 
U T A H POWER & LIGHT I 
COMPANY, a Maine corporation, \ 
Defendant-Appellant. J 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
N A T U R E OF T H E CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by 
the plaintiff when the mast of a sailboat he and four 
others were carrying from a county road to the north 
shore of Bear Lake (in Idaho) came in contact with 
defendant's electric power line. 
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D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
The case was submitted to the jury pursuant to 
the Idaho comparative negligence statute. The jury 
found the plaintiff sixty (60%) percent negligent and 
the defendant forty (40%) percent negligent. The 
lower court entered a judgment of no cause of action. 
Plaintiff's motion for new trial was granted. Defend-
ant's petition for an intermediate appeal to this court 
was granted. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the order granting a 
new trial and reinstatement of the judgment of no 
cause of action. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
This action for personal injuries arose out of an 
accident that occurred on the north shore of Bear Lake 
in Bear Lake County, Idaho, on July 23, 1972. 
The defendant owns and operates a pumping plant 
at the north end of Bear Lake which is commonly 
known as Camp Lifton (Exs. 36-D, 38-D and 43-D; 
R. 434). The pumping plant is used to pump water 
out of Bear Lake into the North Lake and Bear River 
to be used for irrigation and hydroelectric generation 
(R. 731, P . 509). There is a county road which tra-
verses the causeway at the north end of Bear Lake 
(Exs. 32-D, 34-D, 48-D). The causeway separates 
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Bear Lake from North Lake. The Idaho State Park is 
located on the north shore of Bear Lake approximately 
three-quarters of a mile east of Camp Lifton (Ex. 48-
D ; It. 442). The state park is located on land owned by 
the defendant and leased to the State of Idaho (Exs. 
80-D, 81-D, 82-D). The park is equipped with facilities 
such as picnic tables, culinary water, rest rooms, char-
coal grills and a boat jetty with a cement ramp on the 
end which is used to launch boats (Exs. 19-D, 20-D; It. 
436). Kirk Rich, who was employed by the Idaho De-
partment of Parks as a park ranger at the Idaho State 
Park during the summers of 1970, 1971 and 1972, testi-
fied he had seen hundreds of boats launched from the 
boat jetty (R. 455). The Idaho State Park has been 
a public facility since 1963 (R. 445). The boat jetty 
was constructed in 1964 and 1965 (R. 455). The state 
park is approximately one and three-quarters miles in 
length (R. 435). 
Although camping and boating facilities were 
available in the Idaho State Park east of Camp Lifton, 
the accident occurred in an area just west of Camp 
Lifton. This area is also owned by the defendant (R. 
228). The area west of Camp Lifton is "sandy and 
hilly" and covered with weeds (R. 689, 664). There 
are three separate power lines which run parallel to 
the north shore of Bear Lake west of Camp Lifton 
(Exs. 32-D, 34-D). There is a "230 KV line" which 
crosses the county road just west of Camp Lifton and 
is located along the north side of the county road, a 
"12 KV line" which is located along the south side of 
3 
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the county road and a "46 KV line" which is located 
further south of the county road (R. 733-734, P . 511-
512; Exs. 32-D, 34-D). 
The mast of the boat being carried by the plaintiff 
and his companions came in contact with the 46 KV line 
(Ex. 43-D). 
The 46 KV line was originally constructed in 1913 
and rebuilt on the same alignment in 1957 (R. 784, P . 
586). The National Electric Safety Code, which con-
trols the construction and maintenance of electric power 
lines, requires a minimum vertical clearance of 21 feet at 
sixty degrees temperature for a 46 KV line (R. 784, P . 
586). The line in question was constructed to provide 
26 feet of vertical clearance at 120 degrees temperature 
(R. 784, P . 586). 
The 46 KV line, as built, exceeded the vertical 
clearance requirements of the National Electric Safety 
Code by five feet at twice the temperature (R. 784, P . 
586). This clearance existed on the date of the accident. 
(R. 712, P . 490). The 46 KV line is inspected by fixed-
wing aircraft every month, by helicopter once every six 
months and by walking inspection once every year (R. 
329). The annual walking inspection was performed on 
July 10, 1972 (R. 330). There were no defects found 
in this section of the line (R. 330-331). 
Two weeks before the accident happened, Richard 
Ricks (hereinafter "Ricks"), a friend of the plaintiff 
F . William McGinn (hereinafter "McGinn"), drove to 
Bear Lake to find a camp site (R. 691). Ricks drove 
4 
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through the Idaho State Park and observed the facil-
ities but decided it would be crowded over the July 24th 
weekend. He selected the area west of Camp Lifton 
for the weekend party (R. 692). Ricks made a map 
of the north end of the lake and indicated the camp site 
on the map (R. 577). The map was given to McGinn 
(R. 577). 
There were no camping or boating facilities west 
of Camp Lifton (R. 459-460). However, people did 
use the area for picnicking and swimming particularly 
on holiday weekends when the state park was crowded 
(R. 438). Local people from St. Charles, Paris or 
Montpelier, Idaho, made daytime use of the area (R. 
725, P . 503). There were no Utah Power and Light 
signs in the area west of Camp Lifton (R. 438, 542). 
None of the witnesses who testified had ever seen 
a boat carried from the county road to the lake west 
of Camp Lifton. 
On Saturday evening, July 22, 1972, McGinn and 
his date, Sarah Gittens (hereinafter "Gittens"), drove 
to Bear Lake in McGinn's car (R. 577). Ricks and his 
date, Lana Omura (hereinafter "Omura") drove to 
Bear Lake in Ricks' car (R. 683). Ricks was pulling 
a motorboat behind his automobile (R. 684). James 
McNeil (hereinafter "McNeil") drove to Bear Lake 
alone in his car trailing the catamaran sailboat which 
was involved in the accident (R. 643; Exs. 47-D, 50-
D ) . McGinn and Ricks and McNeil are all fraternity 
brothers (R. 616). 
53 
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McGinn was not able to locate the camp site from 
the map but met Ricks in the Idaho State Park (R. 
639). Ricks directed McGinn out of the state park to 
the area west of Camp Lifton (R. 635-636). McGinn 
and Gittens slept on the beach in an area approximately-
half way between the county road and water's edge 
(Ex. 57-D). This area is almost directly under the 46 
KV line. Ricks and Omura slept near the water's edge 
so they could secure the motorboat which he had 
launched at the Utah State Park (on the west side of 
Bear Lake) and brought to their camp site. McNeil 
slept on the trampoline on his sailboat which was parked 
just south of the county road (R. 646; Ex. 57-D). 
Gittens testified that just before she went to sleep 
she "noticed" a buzzing sound (R. 636). She asked 
McGinn, "what is that buzzing noise?" He answered, 
"Must be power lines or something." She stated they 
thought the buzzing was coming from power lines that 
were running across the road (R. 636). McGinn testi-
fied that Gittens had noticed the humming and asked, 
"What is that buzzing?" McGinn answered, "I t is 
high voltage." (R. 581) McGinn was an employee of 
Yates Electric at the time of the accident (R. 574A 
(missed in pagination)). 
McNeil testified he could hear the power lines hum-
ming as he went to sleep (R. 665-666). He realized 
there was a power line between himself and the road 
(R. 668). 
Omura admitted on cross-examination that she re-
membered being aware of power lines (R. 687). 
6 
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Ricks testified he observed the "power lines" that 
were in the area west of Camp Lifton (R. 696), He 
stated he could hear the buzzing when he was down on 
the beach (R. 696). Ricks said he knew the buzzing 
sound meant there were some electrical lines in the 
area (R. 697). 
McGinn had been sailing before with McNeil at 
Willard Bay. They launched the sailboat there from 
the public ramp (R. 628). 
When they awoke the next morning at about eight-
thirty, it was a clear day (R. 623). They put the sleep-
ing bags in the car, then McNeil and McGinn drove 
west on the county road to a store and service station 
(R, 582-583). The county road is bordered on the 
north by the 230 KV line, on the south by the 12 KV 
line and goes under the 46 KV line approximately one 
and a half miles west of Camp Lifton (R. 781-782, P . 
583-584, Exs. 34-D, 32-D). When McGinn and Mc-
Neil returned to the camp site, they decided to put the 
mast up on the sailboat atid carry it down to the lake 
(R. 583). The mast is 26 feet long (R. 677; Exs. 47 D, 
50-D). It can be "stepped" while the boat is on the 
trailer or on the beach (R. 660-661). After the mast 
was in place, Ricks and McNeil got on one side of the 
boat, McGinn, Omura and Gittens got on the other side 
and they proceeded to carry the 315 pound boat toward 
the lake (R. 584). As they carried the boat toward the 
lake, the mast hit the 46 KV line (R. 584). There are 
weld marks about six inches down from the top of the 
mast where it hit the power line (R. 652; Exs. 53-D, 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
55-D). The electricity apparently went through the 
aluminum mast, an aluminum tiller, then through Mc-
Ginn to ground. The accident happened at about 9:38 
a.m. (R. 742, P . 521). The point where the mast hit 
the power line was 193 feet west of the two poles (struc-
tures) shown on the right hand side of Exhibits 37-D 
and 43-D. The red and yellow fiberglass measuring 
pole in Exhibits 37-D and 43-D is located at the ap-
proximate point where the mast struck the power line 
(R. 711, P . 489). The power line was 29 feet one inch 
above the ground at this point (R. 712, P . 490). 
McGinn was taken to the hospital in Montpelier, 
Idaho, and then to the University of Utah Medical 
Center in Salt Lake City. 
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the court 
ruled that McGinn was not a trespasser as a matter of 
law; that the jury would not be advised of the effect 
of their answers to the questions involved; that plain-
tiff could amend the general prayer from $350,000 to 
$500,000 and that there was insufficient evidence to 
submit an issue of punitive damages to the jury (R. 
815). Defendant's motion for a directed verdict was 
denied (R. 895). The case was submitted to the jury 
on the issue of the defendant's and plaintiff's negli-
gence. The jury returned a special verdict as follows: 
(R. 88). 
S P E C I A L V E R D I C T 
We, the jury, find, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, in this case the following answers to the questions 
propounded to us: 
8 
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Q U E S T I O N NO. 1. Was the defendant Utah 
Power & Light Company guilty of negligence which 
was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries? 
Yes X No 
Q U E S T I O N NO. 2. Was the plaintiff F . Wil-
liam McGinn I I guilty of negligence which was a prox-
imate cause of his injuries? Y x No 
If you answer "y e s" to either of the prior ques-
tions, then answer the next questions. 
Q U E S T I O N NO. 3. Considering all the neglig-
ence that caused the accident to be one hundred percent, 
what percentage is attributable to: 
(a) The defendant Utah Power & Light 
Company 40% 
(b) The plaintiff F . William McGinn 60% 
T O T A L : 100% 
Q U E S T I O N NO. 4. Disregarding any of the 
previous answers, what is the total amount of damages 
sustained by plaintiff F . William McGinn I I as a re-
sult of the incident ? 
(a) General damages including 
lost wages $150,000.00 
(b) Special damages $ 18,150.00 
T O T A L : $168,150.00 
/ s / Marie H . McDonald 
Date: December 3, 1973 Foreman 
9 
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Based on the jury's answers to the special verdict, 
the court entered judgment of no cause of action (R. 
81). Defendant's motion to strike the affidavits or in 
the alternative to obtain counteraffidavits was denied 
(R. 15). Plaintiff's motion for new trial was granted 
on the grounds the jury should have been advised of 
the affect of the comparative negligence and should have 
been advised there is no relationship between the damage 
answer and the percentages (R. 16). Defendant's peti-
tion to this court for an interlocutory appeal was 
granted (R. 2). 
POINT I 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D I N GRANT-
I N G P L A I N T I F F ' S MOTION FOR A N E W 
TRIAL. 
Under the Idaho comparative negligence law, a jury 
should not be informed of the effect their answers to 
the special verdict will have on the final outcome of the 
case. 
Before the trial in this case commenced, the parties, 
through their respective counsel, agreed that since this 
accident occurred on the Idaho side of Bear Lake, this 
matter would be tried under the Idaho comparative 
negligence law. During the trial, a question of law 
arose relating to whether or not the jury should be in-
formed of the effect of their answers to the special in-
terrogatories which would be submitted under the pro-
visions of the Idaho comparative negligence law. Al-
though there was no controlling Idaho decision on 
this issue to guide the trial judge at the time of the 
10 
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trial, (November 26 through December 3, 1973) he 
followed the general rule that the jury should not be 
informed of the effect of their answers to the special 
interrogatories. However, on March 7, 1974, the Su-
preme Court of Idaho in Holland v. Peterson, 
Idaho , 518 P.2d 1190 (1974) ruled that in a 
case tried under comparative negligence, the trial court 
must not instruct the jury as to what effect their 
answers will have on the final outcome of the case. 
"Appellant's final assignment of error is that 
the trial court erred in instructing the jury that 
they should not concern themselves with whether 
their answers to the interrogatories submitted to 
them would be favorable to one party or another. 
The general rule, and the one that we adopt to-
day, is that it is reversible error for the trial court 
to instruct the jury as to the effect their answers 
will have on the final outcome of the case. See 
Annot. 90 ALR2d 1041, (1963). Of course, it 
may not always be possible to frame the inter-
rogatories in language that won't tend to inform 
the jury of the effect, but they should never be 
instructed what it will be." (Emphasis added) 
The Idaho Supreme Court's decision on this issue is 
in accord with nearly all of the other comparative neg-
ligence jurisdictions. Wisconsin clearly does not permit 
the jury to be informed of the effect of its answers to 
the special verdict. Fehrman v. Smirl, 121 N.W.2d 
255 (Wis. 1963) was a malpractice case where the 
judgment for the defendant was reversed because of 
instructions which tended to inform the jury of the re-
sult of its answers to the special verdict. The instruc-
tion read: 
U 
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"You are further insrtucted that it is the duty 
of the patient to follow the reasonable instruc-
tions and submit to the reasonable treatment pre-
scribed by his physician or surgeon. If he fails 
in his duty, and his act or omission directly con-
tributes to the injury or disability, he cannot 
maintain an action for malpractice against his 
physician or surgeon, who is also guilty of an 
act or omission in treating the case." Id. at 265. 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated: 
"Furthermore, because of the use of the phrase 
'cannot maintain an action for malpractice,' this 
instruction is highly objectionable because it 
tends to inform the jury of the legal effect of 
their answer to a question of the special verdict. 
Two other attacked instructions, which were 
given with respect to the jury's answering Ques-
tion One of the special verdict, were also objec-
tionable because couched in terms which tended 
to inform the jury of the legal effect of answer-
ing Question One of the special verdict 'yes»' " Id. 
at 265. 
In Erb v. Mutual Service Casualty Company, 123 
N.W.2d 493 (Wis. 1963), the attorney for the plaintiff 
informed the jury in his argument that if it answered 
a special interrogatory regarding whether an automo-
bile had been sold in the affirmative, the insurance 
policy on the automobile would be void. The Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court held the attorney's comment "in-
defensively improper" and stated: 
"The argument of counsel, however, was calcu-
lated to inform the jury of the effect of their 
answer, and under the facts in the instant action 
were sufficiently prejudicial so as to affect the 
12 
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substantial rights of Mutual Service, warranting 
the granting of a new trial. . . . Id. at 469. 
In Gardner v. Germain, 117 N.W.2d 759 (Minn. 
1962), an automobile death case, the court held that it 
was reversible error to disclose to the jury the legal 
effect of the findings when a special verdict is em-
ployed. Accordingly, the court could not be concerned 
with what the jury hoped the outcome of the case 
would be and could not grant a new trial based upon a 
juror's affidavit that when the jury found both the 
plaintiff and the defendant negligent, it believed the 
plaintiff would recover. See also McCourtie v. United 
States Steel Corp., 93 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1958); 
Flick v. Walfinger, 198 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1972); 
and Johnson v. O'Brien, 105 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. 
1960). 
In Harbison v. Briggs Bros. Paint Manufacturing 
Co., 354 S.W.2d 464 (Tenn. 1962), an action for per-
sonal injuries, the court analyzed the Tennessee special 
verdict statute and held that "it is error for the judge 
to inform the jury of the effect their answers may have 
upon the case because such information would almost 
necessarily defeat the object to be secured by the an-
swers to such interrogatories." Id. at 471. 
Argo v. Blackshear, 416 S.W.2d 314 (Ark. 1967) 
was an action by the parents of a deceased child against 
a motorist who struck and killed the child as she ran 
across the highway. The case was submitted to the jury 
under a special verdict as required by the Arkansas 
comparative negligence statute. The jury returned with 
13 
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a finding of equal negligence on both the plaintiff and 
defendant. The attorney for the plaintiff then re-
quested that the trial judge ascertain whether the jury 
intended for the parents to recover. The judge then 
informed the jury that, under the law, the finding of 
equal negligence barred any recovery by the plaintiffs. 
The jury then returned a verdict in favor of the plain-
tiffs. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and held 
that it was error for the trial judge to specifically in-
form the jurors of the effect on the ultimate judgment 
of their answers to the specially submitted questions. 
The court stated: 
"When the jury was polled and further ques-
tioned by the judge as to their intentions in an-
swering the interrogatories, at no place did they 
retract the findings on total damages and ap-
portionment of negligence. The only additional 
information supplied was to the effect that they 
wanted to see plaintiffs recover the full $18,000. 
This pointedly illustrates the value of interrog-
atories. Jurors honestly answer four relatively 
simple questions, not knowing the legal effect 
will be contrary to their personal wishes. Addi-
tionally, this situation justifies the rule that for 
the judge to specifically inform the jurors as to 
the effect of their answers on the ultimate judg-
ment is reversible error. 90 A.L.R.2d 1041. As 
said by this court in Wright v. Convey, 233 Ark. 
798, 349 S.W.2d 344 (1961) : 'The reason for the 
rule is that the special interrogatories are in-
tended to elicit the jury's unbiased judgment 
upon the issues of fact, and this purpose might 
be frustrated if the jurors are in a position to 
frame their answers with a conscious desire to 
aid one side or the other.' " 
14 
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See also International Harvester Co. v. Pike, 466 
S.W.2d 901 (Ark. 1971) where the court reversed and 
remanded a judgment for the plaintiff on the basis that 
it was error for the plaintiff's attorney to advise the 
jury that an affirmative answer to the assumption of 
risk interrogatory would preclude recovery by the plain-
tiff. 
The only case which appellants have been able to 
locate that holds the jury should be informed of the 
effect of their answers to the special verdict interrog-
atories is a decision by an intermediate court in Color-
ado, Simpson v. Anderson, (Docket No. 73-009, Color-
ado Court of Appeals, 1973). This case is currently on 
appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court, but there has 
been no decision by that court as of the date of this 
brief. Therefore, this Colorado intermediate appellate 
court's decision should not be taken as reliable prece-
dent, especially when compared to the well reasoned 
decisions from courts of final determination, including 
Idaho's, which directly contravene this case. 
The leading work in the field of comparative neg-
ligence is the Comparative Negligence Manual, a prac-
tical treatise of the law in this area. This book was 
written by two of the leading experts in comparative 
negligence law, Carroll R. Heft and C. James Heft. 
These two practicing Wisconsin attorneys have wide 
experience in working with comparative negligence, 
since Wisconsin has had a law similar to Idaho's and 
Utah's for many years. The authors of this treatise 
state that a jury should act solely as a fact finding body 
15 
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and should not be informed of the legal effect of its 
answers. 
"The special verdict is the very cornerstone of 
the comparative negligence concept, and the jury 
does not, and should not, know the legal effect 
and result of its answers to the interrogatories. 
By using the procedure of a special verdict 
under comparative negligence, a jury finds the 
facts without regard to the ultimate outcome of 
the case. The court takes the facts as found by 
the jury and awards judgment. The procedure 
is intended to ascertain the truth untainted by 
prejudice or desire to see one of the parties win 
or lose." . . . Id. Section 8.10, chapter 8, page 1. 
"I t is obvious that meticulous care should be 
exercised in not informing the jury of the effect 
of their answers upon the final outcome of the 
case. Care must be exercised by counsel in argu-
ment. Care must be exercised by the court in the 
wording of the questions and in the instructions. 
I t is one of the cornerstones of comparative 
negligence that the jury be limited to a fact find-
ing body. The interpretation of those facts is 
for the court. Likewise, the application of the 
apportionment question to the entire damages 
found by the jury is likewise the duty of the 
court in the doing of the mathematics." Id. Sec-
tion 7.40, chapter 7, page 6. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that Holland v. 
Peterson, the Idaho comparative negligence case dis-
cussed supra, is controlling in this case. When this re-
cent Idaho decision is considered, together with all the 
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other precedent from comparative negligence jurisdic-
tions, it is clear that one of the fundamental bases of 
comparative negligence with its special verdict pro-
visions is that the jury should act solely as a fact find-
ing body. They should make their factual determina-
tions without the sympathy, bias and prejudice which 
would be inherent if the jury knew the plaintiff could 
not recover unless they found the defendant at least 
51% negligent. In McGinn v. Utah Power & Light, 
the jury, acting as fact finders, determined that the 
plaintiff was guilty of the greater negligence. Unaware 
of the effect their answers would have on the damages 
awarded, the jury made a clear determination that the 
plaintiff was guilty of the greater fault. Under the 
Idaho comparative negligence law, as under the new 
Utah comparative negligence law, the plaintiff recovers 
nothing when the jury determines that he was guilty 
of the greater negligence. On this basis, the trial judge's 
grant of a new trial should be reversed and the jury 
verdict and judgment of no cause of action reinstated. 
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